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Abstract |  I argue that an analysis of Buddhist meditation theory and practice may be used to ground 
a model of the possibility of free agency that stands up against four powerful arguments for free will 
skepticism in contemporary analytic philosophy: Peter van Inwagen’s consequence argument, which 
asserts that if choices are lawfully necessary consequences of prior events, then they are unfree; Derk 
Pereboom’s two arguments for hard incompatibilism: the manipulation argument, which asserts that 
manipulated choices are unfree, determinism is functionally equivalent to manipulation, and thus 
determined choices are unfree; and the randomness argument, which asserts that we cannot claim au-
thorship over random neural events; and Galen Strawson’s impossibility argument, which asserts that 
choices are always conditioned by mental states, so unconditioned free will is impossible. Although 
Buddhism sees the entire process that begins with beliefs and desires and culminates in actions as 
an ultimately impersonal, agentless process, Buddhism is nonetheless capable of formulating the 
diametrical opposite of Strawson’s impossibilism and Pereboom’s hard incompatibilism, what I call 
possibilism or soft compatibilism, the view that free choices and actions can emerge from conditioned 
or unconditioned mental states, independently of whether the world is deterministic. This is not to 
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Powerful arguments against the possibility of free will have become dominant in contemporary 
Western analytic philosophy. Buddhism has resourc-
es that may be deployed to formulate a position that 
may stand up against four of the most powerful ar-
guments for free will skepticism. I support this claim 
in two stages. First, I address the four major argu-
ments for free will skepticism, after outlining neces-
sary terminology and positions shaping the debate. I 
argue that one such argument may subsume the oth-
ers, but I address them all because the subsumption 
claim may be disputed, the others argue for the same 
conclusion, and each might survive if the subsuming 
argument fails. Second, I show how Buddhist ideas 
support a critique of those arguments. Although not 
entirely linear, the explication is arranged for progres-
sively complex comprehension. Also, I focus more on 
these four specific Western arguments than I focus 
on specific Buddhist analogues because I intend to 
show Western philosophers that ‘Buddhism’—more 
realistically, a variety of forms of Buddhism—has the 
resources for rebutting those arguments. 
Comparing specific Western philosophers with ‘Bud-
dhism’ nonetheless appears asymmetrical, but where 
appropriate I identify primary and/or secondary Bud-
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dhist sources for more specific examination. The Bud-
dhism-based account of free will formulated below is 
endorsed by some Buddhist philosophers and disput-
ed by others. (Repetti (2016) contains a comprehen-
sive collection of such positions.) 
The Free Will Terrain 
I present a fairly comprehensive introduction to the 
terminology, concepts, arguments, and issues at stake 
in the free will debate, but I can only say so much here. 
For a greater introduction to the big picture regarding free 
will, see Balaguer (2014), Caruso (2013), and Abelson 
(2013). I prefer the term autonomy to free will. Autonomists 
believe we sometimes exhibit a type of autonomy sufficient 
for appropriately holding us morally responsible for 
our actions; autonomy skeptics deny autonomism. De-
terminists think every event is the lawfully necessary 
consequence of previous events; indeterminists reject 
determinism. Compatibilists think autonomy is com-
patible with determinism. Compatibilist determinists 
are soft determinists. Incompatibilists think autonomy is 
incompatible with determinism (which excludes alter-
natives they consider necessary for autonomy). Incom-
patibilist autonomists are libertarians; incompatibilist 
determinists are hard determinists. Hard indeterminists 
think autonomy is incompatible with indeterminism; 
soft indeterminists think autonomy is compatible with 
indeterminism. Hard incompatibilists consider both 
determinism and indeterminism incompatible with 
autonomy. Impossibilists think autonomy is impossible 
independently of whether determinism is true, because 
every choice is conditioned by the mental state occur-
rent at the moment of choice. Illusionists are autonomy 
skeptics who think our experiential grounds for belief 
in autonomy are infected by subpersonal process-
es subject to illusion. Possibilists consider autonomy 
possible regardless of what mental state one is in; soft 
compatibilists think autonomy is compatible with de-
terminism and indeterminism. Autonomy skeptics, pes-
simists, or non-autonomists include impossibilists, hard 
determinists, hard indeterminists, hard incompatibi-
lists, and illusionists; autonomy gnostics, optimists, or 
autonomists include possibilists, soft determinists, soft 
indeterminists (libertarians), and soft compatibilists. 
One of the most powerful, seminal incompatibilist ar-
guments, first proposed by Ginet, is van Inwagen’s con-
sequence argument, which asserts that if determinism is 
true, agents can never do other than what they are 
determined to do, and thus cannot be free (Ginet 1966; 
van Inwagen 1975). Although van Inwagen argues only 
for incompatibilism, hard determinists add the prem-
ise that determinism is true (at the non-quantum lev-
el, based on the bulk of non-quantum-level science), 
and conclude there is no autonomy. Libertarians are 
autonomists who, conversely, add the premise that 
we possess autonomy (for various reasons, e.g., expe-
rience, phenomenology, and its necessity for morals 
and other basic features of our humanistic self-con-
ception), concluding that determinism must be false, 
at least of some central feature(s) of human agency, 
even if true of everything else.
Another powerful skeptical argument against auton-
omy is Pereboom’s manipulation or four-case argument 
(Pereboom 2001). This argument sets forth a first case 
of manipulation in which it is allegedly clear that 
an agent who is secretly neurally manipulated is not 
morally responsible, and then proceeds through three 
other cases, the last of which involves only the claim 
that the world is deterministic but involves no ma-
nipulation at all, but alleges that the agent is also not 
morally responsible, and challenges the compatibilist 
to identify a morally relevant distinction between any 
features of any two adjacent cases, claiming it is im-
possible to do so. Pereboom advocates hard incom-
patibilism, which adds to the manipulation argument 
the hard indeterminist’s randomness argument that if 
indeterminism is true, choices are random and not 
truly “up to” them, so autonomy is also incompatible 
with indeterminism. 
Perhaps the most powerful autonomy-skeptical argu-
ment is Strawson’s impossibility argument (Strawson 
1986, 2016). He argues that autonomy is impossible—
independently of considerations about whether deter-
minism is true—because every choice is conditioned 
by whatever mental state we are in at and/or just prior 
to the moment of choice, something Buddhism would 
generally accept, but, Strawson adds, we cannot be 
completely and ultimately responsible for the mental 
state we happen to be in at any given moment, and so 
no choice is totally free or unconditioned. Since we 
cannot create ourselves ex nihilo, we can never be in 
a mental state that was not conditioned by previous 
mental states, back to our earliest mental state(s). But 
if we can never be in an unconditioned mental state, 
we can never be ultimately responsible for any mental 
state we are in, nor for any choice we make that is 
conditioned by that mental state. Thus, autonomy in 
the moral-responsibility-entailing sense is impossible.
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Compatibilism-Relevant Ideas
Let us begin with a discussion of some ideas in Bud-
dhism that will be relevant to the issue of autonomy 
and its compatibility with determinism, indetermin-
ism, and the conditioning of mental states. I argue 
that meditation and related volition-regulating disci-
plines that lead Buddhists toward liberation increase 
autonomy-related abilities in the soft compatibilist 
sense, and that an analysis of these abilities provides 
the basis for a Buddhist counter to these skeptical ar-
guments. The Buddhist meditative path is designed 
to eliminate what Buddhist theory sees as the illu-
sory belief in an ontologically substantive ego/self, 
and with it the unregulated expression of ego-voli-
tional preferences seen as fueling the illusory sense 
of ego/self. However, the unregulated expression of 
ego-based volitions is, from a Western perspective, 
thought to be partly constitutive of autonomy. West-
ern thought prizes the autonomy-related ability to act 
on one’s desires and preferences, do as one pleases, 
and make choices that are up to one whenever alter-
natives pull one in different directions. Thus, whereas 
Buddhism generally eschews the idea of catering to 
ego-volitional preferences, Western philosophy has 
struggled to square these autonomy-related abilities 
with determinism (in earlier times, to square them 
with God’s foreknowledge, and more recently with 
indeterminism). The closest to this that Buddhism 
has struggled to explain is the problem of how voli-
tional (karmic) formations can accrue to, or how rein-
carnation is possible for, individuals that are thought 
to lack substantive selves. 
Historically, Buddhism has not been concerned with 
how individuals may be properly held morally respon-
sible, for a number of inter-related reasons. First, be-
cause—though individual actors are considered caus-
ally (karmically) responsible, and though karma has 
positive/negative connotations consistent with a kind 
of consequentialism in which suffering should be re-
duced and happiness promoted—karmic consequenc-
es are not seen as retributive, but purely causal (Good-
man 2009). Second, because blame of self/others are 
sometimes treated differently. In the Bodhicāryāvatāra, 
Śāntideva advises us to see others’ actions as ultimate-
ly impersonally caused (like bile production), but to 
view our own actions as subject to self-regulation for 
soteriological purposes (Shantideva and Padmakara 
2009, 6:22-32), which self-regulative efforts avowed 
Buddhists accept as ethically binding them, particu-
larly in later (Mahāyāna) Buddhism, to cultivate the 
pāramitās, six ethical character perfections (generosity, 
moral disposition, perseverance, energy, meditative at-
tainment, and wisdom), as well as the brahmavihāras, 
the four divine abodes (loving-kindness, compassion, 
sympathetic joy, and equanimity). This framework 
does not fit neatly into Western metaethical cate-
gories, but focuses on perfecting ethical cultivation 
within the soteriological framework of the Buddhist 
path (Garfield 2015). Third, because Buddhist phi-
losophy restricts warrants for philosophical inquiry 
to what is soteriologically instrumental, and the issue 
of blame and its problematic relationship with im-
personal causal processes is not considered warrant-
ed (Gowans 2016). Fourth, because Buddhism sees 
agency as ultimately impersonal and its illusion as the 
cause of suffering, and is thus more concerned with 
eliminating ego-volitional agency in favor of selfless/
altruistic volition than with defending it.
Likely due to its recent encounters with Western phi-
losophy and science, however, scholars of Buddhism 
have recently tried to articulate what Buddhism can 
say about the problem of autonomy (Adam 2010; Co-
seru 2016; Davis 2016; Federman 2010, 2016; Frique-
gnon 2016; Garfield 2014; Gier and Kjellberg 2004; 
Gómez 1975; Goodman 2009, 2016; Griffiths 1982; 
Harvey 2007, 2016; Hyland 2014; Meyers 2010, 2016; 
Rāhula 1974; Repetti 2016; Siderits 1987, 2008; Sto-
ry 1976; Tuske 2013; Wallace 2011). And as Western 
philosophers of mind have come to see the nature of 
mind, agency, and action in increasingly impersonal 
terms, they have turned an eye toward Buddhism to 
mine its rich history of philosophical articulation of 
these ideas (Blackmore 2014; Davis and Thompson 
2015; Flanagan 2011; Strawson 1986, 2016; Thomp-
son 2015). Toward this end, I defend the idea that 
Buddhist thought can ground a moral-responsibili-
ty-entailing autonomy against all four major skepti-
cal arguments, but let us first sketch the autonomist 
possibilism that represents the target of these skeptical 
arguments. 
Classical compatibilists, like Hume, argued that au-
tonomy is compatible with determinism because it is 
not the fact that our actions are caused that matters 
here, but how they are caused. Classical compatibilists 
offer divergent accounts of how our actions are sup-
posed to be appropriately caused, but typically these 
accounts are articulated in negative terms—involving 
the absence of freedom-undermining conditions. For 
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example, if not coerced, constrained, compulsive, the 
result of brainwashing, torture, or manipulation, all 
freedom-undermining conditions, then that they are 
caused need not undermine the claim that they may 
be sufficiently free in the moral-responsibility-entail-
ing sense. Neo-compatibilists attempt more explicitly 
naturalistic, sophisticated, positive accounts of such 
matters, focusing generally on whether or not the 
agent exhibits the appropriate sort of proximal con-
trol over her action-producing processes; for example, 
what matters for these accounts is whether or not 
they are voluntary, reason-responsive, in accord with 
preferences or values, the result of deliberation, and so 
forth. Some neo-compatibilist accounts combine the 
absence of negative conditions with the presence of 
positive conditions.
Though much in Buddhism and in thinking about au-
tonomy exceeds it, I focus on what fits within a natu-
ralistic framework, to occupy the more parsimonious 
position. Central Buddhist ideas posing an immediate 
problem for the notion of autonomy are: imperma-
nence, mereological reductionism or eliminativism (the 
partial or complete denial of partite wholes), depend-
ent origination, and insubstantiality or emptiness. Each 
of these ideas implies anātman (non-self ), denial of 
the (non-Buddhist Indian) ātman (the unchanging, 
immaterial self/soul). Impermanence characterizes 
all conditioned phenomena (Dhammapada 277-279): 
nothing in form (spatiotemporal) lasts unchanged 
more than an instant. Thus, if there is any candidate 
for a self-like element, it is at best a momentary flash 
in a temporally-contiguous psychophysical series of 
shifting impersonal elements. 
A whole is at best just a way of designating a config-
uration of parts, but does not exist independently of 
the parts, nor is it identical to them (for they are many 
and it is one): it is merely a conceptual imputation; see 
Milindapañha, Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, and Siderits 
(2003). Thus, the ‘self ’ is just a convenient designa-
tion for the psychophysical series. Some Buddhists 
are reductionists, others eliminativists, but all reject 
the ultimate or fundamental reality of self. Buddhist 
reductionism/eliminativism (depending on the inter-
pretation) is classically depicted in the Milindapañha, 
when Buddhist monk Nagasena argues with Bactrian 
King Milinda (thought to be Menander) that just as 
the ‘chariot’ exists only as a conventional designation 
for its pragmatically configured parts, but is neither 
identical to nor additional to them, so too are all part/
whole relations, including Nagasena and Milinda. 
According to the doctrine of dependent origination 
(pratītya samutpāda), which resembles determinism, 
because all conditioned phenomena originate in de-
pendence on other conditioned phenomena, no con-
ditioned phenomenon exists autonomously. The Bud-
dha stated, “When that is present, this comes to be; 
on the arising of that, this arises. When that is absent, 
this does not come to be; on the cessation of that, this 
ceases.” (Majjhima Nikāya 1.262 ff.; Saṃyutta Nikāya 
2.28) An organism, say, cannot exist independently of 
extra-organismic, eco-system-dependent conditions. 
Since no conditioned phenomena exist independently, 
all conditioned phenomena and beings are metaphys-
ically insubstantial or empty, lacking any independent 
ontological/existential essence, status, or intrinsic na-
ture. Western philosophers might interpret this as a 
Buddhist claim to the effect that there are no natu-
ral kinds, the self included. Natural kinds are sets or 
types of things that putatively have mind-independ-
ent features in common, such as chemical elements, 
as opposed to sets or types of things that only have 
mind-dependent characteristics in common, such as 
the characteristic of being called by a certain nick-
name or of tasting lemonade. The self lacks substan-
tive reality on all these grounds. 
Further, the Buddha rejected the idea that any of the 
(mereological) ‘aggregates’ that compose us (body, 
volition, cognition, feeling, etc.) constitute a self, be-
cause if such an aggregate did, it could will itself—
without mediation—into a non-afflicted state, but no 
part of us can (Anattalakkhaṇa Sutta; Adam 2010). 
Just as Western philosophers have objected that the 
Cartesian mind—being immaterial—cannot interact 
with any physical brain/body, exposing the incoher-
ence of the notion of immaterial mind, Buddhist phi-
losophers, principal among them Nāgārjuna, objected 
that the unchanging nonphysical ātman would be in-
capable of doing anything (Mūlamadhyamakakārikā; 
Federman 2010). These arguments are mutually con-
firming: whatever might constitute self cannot be 
causally inert, therefore cannot exist independently, 
and thus must be dependently originated, momentary, 
partite, and empty, and vice versa.
Given the Buddhist anātman doctrine it seems Bud-
dhism would equally deny the reality of autonomy. For 
Goodman (2009, 2016), a non-agent/non-self cannot 
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be autonomous. If selves do not exist, there cannot be 
autonomous selves, but that does not mean there can-
not be autonomy—any more than the alleged nonex-
istence of red apples means there cannot be anything 
red (Repetti 2012b). Those who deny partite wholes 
like chariots—the classic Buddhist analogy—or selves 
may be pressed to deny the parts of parts, and so on, 
all the way down (Siderits 2003, 2008). But this is 
problematic because whatever has magnitude is log-
ically divisible ad infinitum. Thus, nothing partite is 
reducible to anything non-partite, but non-partite in-
divisibles—if any—lack magnitude and thus cannot 
aggregate to form anything that could play the role of 
even an illusory whole. Since the world of experience 
is populated by such aggregated or seemingly whole 
entities, this line of reasoning alone cannot account 
for it (Repetti 2012a). If this is an argument against 
the reality of self, it is also an argument against the 
reality of chemical bonds, hands, chairs, Buddhas, and 
just about everything.
Thus, attempts to rest negative conclusions about 
autonomy on the rejection of wholes substitute one 
mystery for another, and beg the question, because 
their premise is more problematic than their con-
clusion. A similar analysis may be applied, mutatis 
mutandis, to the other Buddhism-intrinsic grounds 
for the rejection of self, namely, dependent origina-
tion or impermanence. The fact that plants cannot 
exist independently of the photons that fuel their 
necessary photosynthesis does not entail that there 
are no plants, but only that there are no ontologically 
autonomous plants—plants that exist independently 
of plant-exogenous conditions. The putative fact that 
all conditioned phenomena are at some ultimate lev-
el impermanent does not imply that there is no such 
thing, say, as the Verrazano Bridge, but only that its 
micro-constituents are in a constant state of change. 
I could care less if the money in my account is con-
stantly vanishing, as long as it is constantly replacing. 
Similar reasoning applies to the suffering of sentient 
beings, the elimination of which is one of Buddhism’s 
prime directives.
Buddhism avoids this line of objection by dividing 
reality into two truths: conventional and ultimate. Sim-
plifying greatly, Buddhism acknowledges the conven-
tional existence of plants, money, sentient beings, and 
so on, but denies that such entities exist in ultimate re-
ality. (This distinction is interpreted differently within 
major doctrinal divisions of Buddhism, too complex 
to go into here, but analogous to the way empiricism 
or phenomenology are understood differently within 
different Western traditions. For an excellent intro-
duction to the major doctrinal views on the distinction 
based on authoritative Buddhist texts, see Thakchoe 
(2011); for an in-depth analysis, see Thakchoe 2007.) 
Arguably, the two-truths distinction maps loosely 
onto the difference between mereological reduction-
ism and mereological eliminativism: conventional 
reality, on this view, involves a form of mereological 
reductionism about wholes, in that wholes sort of ex-
ist, somewhat, pragmatically, but only because they 
supervene on or reduce ultimately to things that re-
ally do exist at the micro-level, and ultimate reality, 
on this view, involves a form of mereological elimi-
nativism about wholes, in that they don’t really exist 
at all (Siderits 2008). Joining these, we may say con-
ventionally bridges exist, but ultimately nothing exists 
independently of our conceptual designation of the 
dependently-originated, momentary, insubstantial/
empty conditioned phenomena the aggregation of 
which we pragmatically identify as ‘bridges.’ 
Thus, it makes conventional, pragmatic sense to divide 
the world up into chariots and agents who drive them, 
although ultimately these decompose into series of 
empty ephemera. Karma may be accounted for on 
this view as cause and effect, and reincarnation may 
be accounted for as an extension of the already-per-
sisting illusion of personal survival that attends any 
two consecutive moments of ordinary consciousness 
in the same person-series—despite there being no ul-
timately existent self that is the bearer of karma, who 
reincarnates, or who persists identically through any 
consecutive moments (Siderits 2003).
Despite its promising appearances, the two-truths 
doctrine (hereafter, “2Ts”) admits of divergent, com-
plex interpretations (Thakchoe 2007, 2011), and 
seems more problematic than autonomy does. Thus, 
appeal to 2Ts is question begging, for if 2Ts is to 
ground a negative view of autonomy, as a premise 2Ts 
requires greater support than the conclusion it pur-
ports to support (Repetti 2012a, 2012b). For 2Ts not 
only denies the ultimate reality of autonomy, but also 
of hands, money, and just about everything else—ex-
cept, on one reading (accepted only by pre-Mahāyāna 
Buddhists), the ultimate reality of dharmas (Sanskrit; 
Pāli: dhammas, micro-phenomena): impartite atom-
istic psychophysical tropes like whiteness, sweetness, 
volition, and the like (Siderits 2003, 2008), which en-
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tities are, from a Western philosophical and scientific 
perspective, of a dubious nature (Repetti 2012a). At 
the same time, 2Ts is analogous to the scientific bifur-
cation of such pairs of folk/scientific concepts as wa-
ter/H20, weight/mass, and heat/mean molecular kinetic 
energy. If all that is meant by “there is no such thing 
as heat in ultimate reality” is that “there is only mean 
molecular kinetic energy,” then the analogous claim 
for autonomy as some complex form of volitional 
self-regulation seems hardly eliminative. I see no bar 
in Buddhism to the reductionist interpretation, which 
I have developed elsewhere (Repetti 2012a, 2012b) 
and sketch below.
Challenges to Autonomy from Causation
The four main skeptical arguments discussed above 
may be grouped together with a variety of related 
skeptical challenges to autonomy as challenges from 
causation. These arguments are challenges from causa-
tion to the extent that they all involve some form of the 
claim that because putatively free volitional behavior is 
causally produced, conditioned, or influenced in some 
way or another it cannot be free. The consequence ar-
gument may be the most straightforward challenge 
from causation because it asserts that if putatively free 
choices are caused by prior states of the universe in 
accordance with deterministic laws, they cannot be 
free, because alternatives are never available to agents 
to choose otherwise than whatever choice the earlier 
world-state determined. The manipulation argument 
counts as a challenge from causation because it asserts 
that there is no principled difference between manip-
ulation of an agent’s beliefs, desires, or will by any-
thing extrinsic to the agent, which renders the agent’s 
choices unfree, on the one hand, and determinism, on 
the other hand. The randomness argument counts as a 
challenge from causation because it asserts that even 
if the will is indeterministically caused it is not free, 
because if choices are indeterministic, their random 
occurrence is beyond the agent’s control. The impos-
sibility argument counts as a challenge from causa-
tion because it asserts that the agent’s mental states 
condition her choices, so they cannot be free, and 
conditioning involves some kind of causal influence, 
however unspecified. Illusionist arguments count as 
challenges from causation because they rest on em-
pirical findings that suggest causal deviance beneath 
various cognitive abilities associated with autonomy 
(e.g., unconscious biases, post-facto confabulation, 
etc.), implying that our conscious states are causally 
impotent in the production of our choices. 
Optimist’s and Pessimist’s Dilemmas 
Autonomy pessimists pose a certain dilemma for au-
tonomy optimists, such that whether determinism 
or indeterminism is true, there can be no autonomy. 
Before laying out the dilemma, let us first articulate 
some of its essential conceptual elements. Thus, the 
basic idea in the consequence argument is that if A’s 
cause B’s deterministically, they do so necessarily in ac-
cordance with exceptionless generalizations or laws; 
so, if determinism is true, then all behavior occurs as a 
necessary result of previously determined phenomena, 
and the future only admits of exactly one temporal 
event sequence that rules out all possible alternatives, 
and thus rules out autonomy. The basic idea in the 
randomness argument is that if A’s cause B’s indeter-
ministically, they do so probabilistically, in accordance 
with statistical generalizations that admit of excep-
tions; thus it is an accident which future emerges from 
prior world-states, akin to the outcome of a coin toss. 
Consider a dilemma faced by the optimist, from a 
conjunction of the consequence argument’s and/or 
the manipulation argument’s deterministic challenge 
and the argument from randomness, the optimist’s di-
lemma:
1. Either determinism or indeterminism is true.
2. If determinism is true, agents cannot bring about 
anything not already determined (regardless of 
what criteria they satisfy), and thus lack autonomy.
3. If indeterminism is true, choices are random, thus 
agents cannot claim to author them, and lack au-
tonomy.
4. Thus, either way, autonomy is impossible.
This argument is the basis for hard incompatibilism, 
all components of which have been discussed above. 
However, as I have argued (Repetti 2010a), an oppo-
site dilemma may be posed for the pessimist by re-
taining claim 1, negating and transposing the conse-
quents across 2 and 3, yielding the opposite of claim 
4, the pessimist’s dilemma:
1. Either determinism or indeterminism is true.
2. If determinism is true, choices are not random, 
thus agents can claim to author them, and may 
possess autonomy.
3. If indeterminism is true, agents can bring about 
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things not already determined (and satisfy criteria 
that make a difference), and may possess autonomy.
4. Thus, either way, autonomy is possible.
This argument is the basis for soft compatibilism. In 
support of its premises 2 and 3, I need only refer to 
2 and 3 in the optimist’s dilemma, transposing their 
conditionality, and to the works of other philosophers. 
Regarding premise 3, Kane (2002), Mele (1995), and 
others have given good reasons to think indetermin-
ism may be situated in parts of the deliberative process 
that would enhance autonomy; e.g., Kane constructs 
a model in which conflicting deterministic processes 
generate an indeterministic space that opens up al-
ternate possibilities and enables the agent to be the 
efficient cause of which possibility is actualized, and 
Mele has argued that randomness in the generation of 
reasons for consideration, precursors to reasons for ac-
tion, would increase the creativity and diversity of such 
options, which intuitively would enhance the range of 
possible choices opened to the agent. As for premise 
2, Frankfurt (1971), Dennett (1984), Flanagan (2002), 
Fischer (2006), and others have presented plausible 
accounts of ways determined agents may act with 
varying degrees of metavolitional/volitional accord, 
proximal self-regulation, voluntariness, and/or rea-
son-responsiveness sufficient for responsible agency.
Dispositions, Counterfactuals, Possibilities, 
and Actualism 
Let us now challenge hard determinism. Just as salt is 
soluble (in liquid), an agent is able to raise his hand 
(voluntarily). Consider a shortened version of the con-
sequence argument: 
1. Whatever is not determined can never arise.
2. Thus, an agent can never do otherwise—anything 
other than what was determined.
3. Because the agent can never do otherwise, the 
agent cannot be autonomous. 
Hard determinists may object that salt cannot bring 
it about that it is placed in water. However, disposi-
tions like solubility entail counterfactuals (hypotheti-
cal statements contrary to the facts) of the form, “had 
this salt been submerged in water, it would have dis-
solved,” or subjunctives of the form, “if this salt were 
submerged in liquid, then it would dissolve.” Thus, it is 
possible salt dissolves, if certain conditions arise, even if 
salt is never exposed to them, and never actually dis-
solves; alternately, there is a possible world in which 
salt is thus exposed and dissolves. A hard determin-
ism that denies non-actual possibilities may be called 
actualism, the view that only what is, was, or will be 
actual is possible. Actualism rules out non-actual pos-
sibilities, so if autonomy requires them (say, by requir-
ing that the agent could have done otherwise had she 
wanted to), then autonomy does not exist. 
However, deterministic actualism cannot reject 
counterfactual possibilities without defeating itself, 
because determinism just is an abstraction from all 
counterfactual-supporting generalizations or laws; for 
example, if A’s necessarily cause B’s, this supports the 
counterfactual if there had been an A, then there would 
have been a B, or the subjunctive if there were an A, 
then there would be a B. (Here I note, but set aside, 
worries about nearby possible worlds in which block-
ers or masks render it false that B accompanies A, even 
if A causes B, since such complications don’t bear on 
the present point.) Deterministic actualism is thus ox-
ymoronic; by default, deterministic counterfactualism 
is tautologous. Thus, the following approximation/
sketch of a determinism-friendly subjunctive (or an 
equivalent counterfactual) may be held to be partly 
constitutive of autonomy: 
If in doing x an agent would have done likewise 
even if he could have done otherwise, and if he 
would have done otherwise had he wanted to, then 
he is autonomous in doing x
Let us call this sketch the counterfactual principle of au-
tonomy (“CPA”). CPA-type principles may be used to 
identify a determinism-friendly model of responsible 
agency (Repetti 2010a).
Unlike salt, which is helpless regarding whether it 
meets its solubility condition (liquid immersion), 
agents can bring about conditions needed to increase 
what Buddhism identifies as mental freedom and thus 
can cultivate abilities that increasingly satisfy CPA 
conditions. Buddhism specifies how we may do so in 
its many prescriptions for approaching nirvāṇa (San-
skrit; Pāli: nibbāna, total mental freedom), by culti-
vating, through meditative disciplines, true beliefs, 
wholesome volitions, mindfulness, mental focus, men-
tal stability, detachment, phenomenological insight 
into the triggers of our volitional processes, mental 
equilibrium, etc., and by decreasing such things as 
false beliefs, unwholesome (ego-based) volitions, 
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mindlessness, mental disturbances (anger, jealousy, 
greed, hatred, craving), attachment, etc. Insofar as an 
agent follows the prescription he will attain mental 
freedom, which admits of degrees, and—this is the 
main point of this paper—insofar as a being increas-
ingly approximates nirvāṇa she increasingly satisfies 
CPA in her choices, thereby exhibiting increasingly 
effective autonomy.
Meditative practice is at the core of the development 
of these skills. Buddhism classifies meditation types—
simplifying greatly—as involving some concatenation 
of one-pointedness and mindfulness. These terms have 
technical meanings in Buddhism that are sometimes 
conflated in English; in fact, many traditional Bud-
dhists (Purser, Forbes, and Burke 2016; Purser and 
Loy 2013; Sharf 2012) object to the widely popular 
Western extraction of the ethically-neutered ‘mind-
fulness’ as ‘bare attention’ successfully adapted to psy-
chotherapeutic uses in the mindfulness-based stress 
reduction and mindfulness-based cognitive thera-
py movements spearheaded by Kabat-Zinn (1991), 
which have mushroomed interest in ‘mindfulness’ 
from the military to leadership, education. (For oppos-
ing views, see Brown et al. (2015), Federman (2016), 
Hyland (2014), Repetti (2016c).) Even philosophy is 
on board (Davis 2016; Davis and Thompson 2015; 
Garfield 2015; Repetti 2010b, 2016a, 2016b; Straw-
son 1986; 2016; Thompson 2015).
Mindfulness is the translation for sati (Pāli; Sanskrit: 
smṛti), which also suggests remembering and familiar-
ity, but as a technique refers to the ability to attend 
non-conceptually to the experiential/phenomenolog-
ical features of the object of focus, thought to lead 
to the deepest (Buddhist) metaphysical insights, i.e., 
impermanence, interdependence, and insubstantiali-
ty/emptiness. Insight is the translation for vipassanā 
(Pāli; Sanskrit: vipaśyanā), although popular An-
glophone usage loosely translates it as mindfulness. 
One-pointedness is the translation for samadhi (Pāli, 
Sanskrit), the ability to maintain focus, thought to 
lead to tranquility, ‘mental quiescence’ ‘calm abiding,’ 
(Sanskrit: śamatha). Meditative discipline is also the 
translation for samādhi, which includes both mind-
fulness and one-pointedness as well as effort (Lutz, 
Dunne, and Davidson 2007) 
These practices also cultivate patience, detachment, 
greater distance or ‘elbow room’ between stimuli/
impulses and responses, and thus increased self-con-
trol (Repetti 2010a; 2010b; Harvey 2007; Federman 
2010). These skills are cultivated within a philosoph-
ical/soteriological system designed to reduce mental 
bondage and increase mental freedom. Those three in-
sights noted above arose upon the Buddha’s meditative 
penetration into the phenomenology of experience: 
impermanence (all is momentary), interdependence 
(everything is dependent on everything that contrib-
uted to its existence), and insubstantiality/emptiness 
(everything lacks metaphysical essence/substance). 
The nirvāṇa-generating insight that follows is that 
there is no metaphysically substantive self. As one as-
similates the unreality of self, ego-volitions diminish. 
Buddhist versions of CPA might express such ideas 
as that if agent A were thoroughly mindful of A’s vo-
litions, A would be less driven by them or, if A had 
made an effort to bring about an antidote volition 
V2 (say, compassion-involving) to counteract an un-
wholesome volition V1 (say, resentment-involving), A 
would have displaced V1’s force. The less A is driven 
by unwholesome volitions, the more control A has 
over them. This increase in mental freedom is coex-
tensive with an increase in responsible self-regulation 
(agency/autonomy). 
Even if responsible agency is not afforded intrinsic 
value in Buddhism (because Buddhism seeks to move 
away from reactive attitudes and the idea of an au-
tonomous controller of actions), these considerations 
show that the responsible agency adumbrated here 
has instrumental (soteriological) value. Thus, though 
Buddhism avoids abstract philosophical discussions 
that lack soteriological warrants, this discussion is 
warranted.
Strawson’s Impossibility Argument 
As noted earlier, influence counts as a challenge from 
causation. Though Strawson is a kind of compatibi-
list (Repetti 2011), his impossibility argument rests 
on influence, posing a more general challenge than the 
optimist’s dilemma. 
The impossibility argument claims that the mental 
state one is in at the moment of choice influences or 
conditions that choice, rendering it a function of that 
state and thus not ultimately free in the responsibili-
ty-entailing sense. 
Strawson argues that the only way one could be un-
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influenced and thus ultimately responsible for choice 
is if one began in an uninfluenced state, but an unin-
fluenced state would only be possible for a being that 
created itself ex nihilo (from no conditions), a kind of 
causa sui or self-created being, which is logically im-
possible (to create oneself one must exist prior to one’s 
creation). 
Strawson’s argument may be taken, arguendo, to gloss 
the other causal challenges. For, whether one’s men-
tal state is deterministically, indeterministically, ma-
nipulatively, or unconsciously/neurally generated, it 
remains that something influences one’s mental state 
in the choice-moment. Thus, the impossibility argu-
ment subsumes most if not all skeptical, pessimistic 
arguments discussed above, since how one’s choice-
moment-mental-state is influenced is irrelevant to the 
fact that it is influenced. 
The Buddhist rebuttal to this version of the impossibil-
ity argument constitutes an argument—not a proof—
for possibilism, and a potential rebuttal to many of the 
other skeptical, pessimist arguments and positions, 
excepting any that might have relevantly unique fea-
tures. (Clarke (2005) has a rebuttal to Strawson’s im-
possibility argument, for example, that likely does not 
apply to the manipulation argument.) Again, though 
Buddhism has historically ignored the autonomy is-
sue and some contemporary Buddhist scholars pre-
fer to, that Buddhism has the resources to formulate 
a possibility argument that can rebut many, most, if 
not all of these challenges from causation is reason 
alone not only to consider it, but to take it seriously.
Frankfurt’s Distinction, Meditation, and Free-
dom-fostering Influences 
In my view, a Buddhist conception of autonomy may 
be formulated negatively, as a kind of freedom from 
various forms of mental bondage, particularly delu-
sional cognitive and volitional bondage. These are 
related in obvious ways when, say, we are mindlessly 
attached to satisfying unwholesome desires based on 
cognitive errors. In Buddhism, all ego-based volitions 
exemplify this relationship between ignorance about 
the self and its corollary volitional bondage.
Practices that increase such bondage generate men-
tal-freedom-undermining influences; practices that 
decrease it generate mental-freedom-enhancing in-
fluences. Buddhism posits that meditation reduces 
mental-freedom-undermining influences, and thus 
increases mental freedom, precisely through mental 
state influences. These influences may be viewed use-
fully through the lens of Frankfurt’s distinction be-
tween first-order desires (for experiences or things) 
and higher-order desires or metavolitions (that have 
other volitions or desires as their objects, or pro- and 
con-attitudes towards certain first-order desires). 
The will of a person is typically volitionally/meta-
volitionally structured or hierarchical, for Frankfurt, 
whereas the will of an infant or nonhuman animal is 
typically unstructured, entirely first-order. Freedom of 
will, for Frankfurt, is having the sort of will one wants, 
such that the first-order desires one meta-volitional-
ly approves are the only ones that succeed in action, 
whereas weakness of will occurs when metavolitions fail 
to regulate volitions. Chronic cases involve addiction, 
compulsion, and other breakdowns of will. Despite 
its lack of adherents, and certain technical objections 
(Tuske 2013), these elements of Frankfurt’s model are 
insightful, explanatorily powerful, and highly intuitive 
(Repetti 2010a), particularly insofar as they fit nicely 
with a certain Buddhist conception of freedom. Note 
that I am not arguing that Buddhism endorses Frank-
furt’s theory of autonomy, but only that it may adapt 
Frankfurt’s distinctions to fruitful ends.
Buddhist meditators are increasingly able to form 
the sort of effective, hierarchically structured, men-
tal-freedom-oriented wills they want, through long, 
disciplined effort. Buddhist meditative training in-
volves long-term discipline with one-pointedness and 
mindfulness, an introspective analogue of intense ath-
letic (proprioceptive) training of the body or of sci-
entific (exteroceptive) training of analytic observa-
tion that cultivates a heightened degree of impartial, 
non-judgmental (but highly discriminative), non-re-
active, concentrated focus on and attention to the 
phenomenology of the practitioner’s cognitive/cona-
tive dynamics, which practice renders those dynamics 
more transparent to the agent (Thompson 2015). This 
long-term phenomenological investigation generates 
detachment from spontaneously generated volitional 
impulses—that is, an ability to not act on the sorts of 
first-order volitions that typically lead to action. 
Skill at introspective investigation of volitional phe-
nomenology generates insight into the impersonal 
nature and functioning of volitional phenomena, and 
thereby fosters the meditator’s ability to dis-identify 
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with egocentric volitions, to not act on them, and to 
increase control over them, as well as the meta-abil-
ity to form appropriate, effective pro- and con-at-
titudes or metavolitions regarding freedom- and 
bondage-fostering volitional influences, respectively 
(Harvey 2007; Federman 2010). That is, by cultivat-
ing heightened levels of introspective skill, long-term 
meditation practitioners become increasingly mindful 
of the functional dynamics of their volitional disposi-
tions, increasingly able to refrain from acting on voli-
tional impetuses, increasingly skilled at fostering those 
cognitive/conative influences that are freedom-en-
hancing, and diminishing those that are bondage-en-
hancing (Wallace 2011). All of this is prima facie con-
sistent with the 2Ts conception of the conventional 
agent (the volition-regulating, hierarchically complex 
meditation practitioner) as an ultimately impersonal 
series of psychophysical phenomena, technical diffi-
culties associated with the 2Ts and with Frankfurt’s 
theory notwithstanding. Nonetheless, let’s review the 
problem with Frankfurt’s theory, and show how easily 
Buddhism can circumvent it.
Critics object that the theory implies it is a high-
er-level volition, say, L2, that renders the lower-lev-
el volition, L1, free (when L2 endorses L1), but to 
render L2 free it must be endorsed by L3, and so 
on, which self-iterative formula generates a regress 
(Repetti 2010a; Tuske 2013). Even if this is fatal to 
Frankfurt’s theory (which I doubt), it is not fatal to my 
use of his distinctions within the CPA framework: the 
Buddhist model needs no iterative formula, but only 
the claim that metavolitional CPAs correlate increas-
es in mental freedom with increases in responsible 
agency, avoiding any regress (Repetti 2010b).
The Fallacy of the Heap 
The Frankfurt-informed Buddhist model of responsi-
ble agency formulated above may be used to undermine 
Strawson’s impossibility argument, although possibly 
not directly targeting what Strawson targets, as I’ll ex-
plain. The fallacy of the heap is a sorites type fallacy 
because it erroneously infers that there are no such 
things as heaps of sand from the inability to demar-
cate an exact number of grains of sand within a range 
of n+1/n-1 grain that would be required to constitute 
or identify a heap or non-heap of sand, respectively. 
Just as there are obviously heaps of sand and non-
heaps, though we may not be able to demarcate them 
by any exact value of n for the formula of n+1 or n-1 
grain, there are obviously more or less free minds and 
choices, though they emerge from within conditioned 
or influenced mental states and we have yet to demar-
cate their exact threshold conditions. But Buddhism 
comes close in the Abhidharma and other texts (Bo-
dhi 1995; Buddhaghosa and Nanamoli 2003), for ex-
ample, which texts specify the stages on the path to 
nirvāṇa, with extremely fine-grained phenomenolog-
ically-grounded analyses of various otherwise experi-
entially coarse-grained mental states that involve dif-
ferentiations between psychophysical tropes counted 
in the trillions per blink of an eye (Vissudhimagga).
Skilled in introspective phenomenological investiga-
tion into the dynamics of volition, āryas (adept Bud-
dhist meditation practitioners) are increasingly able 
to refrain from acting on the sorts of mental-bond-
age-fostering volitional impulses that typically 
prompt unskilled, ordinary individuals into action, 
further diminishing their mental (cognitive/volition-
al) freedom, if not to fully detach from those impulses 
and eliminate them in favor of antidote-type men-
tal-freedom-fostering volitions. Surely, this skill plac-
es āryas toward the better end on the scale of men-
tal-freedom-fostering and mental-bondage-fostering 
influences. We need not be able to quantify the extent 
of their mental freedom in precise terms, just as we 
may not be able to specify the number of grains of 
sand required for heaps, but surely there are small and 
large heaps of sand as well as persons with lesser and 
greater degrees of mental freedom. 
The impossibility argument seems to demand that 
any degree of mental-state influence entails mental 
bondage or unfreedom, but this seems wildly implau-
sible in itself, and much more so in light of the above 
considerations. Even if we grant the point, however, 
which we need not, Strawson’s argument implicit-
ly differentiates between conditioning influences of 
two quantities, 0 and 0+n (where n is a non-zero or 
positive quantity), and parses freedom and unfree-
dom, respectively. Buddhism offers the possibility 
of transitioning from and thus escaping unfreedom 
(0+n influence) and attaining total mental freedom 
(0 influence) upon the attainment of nirvāṇa, which 
may be defined for our purposes as liberation from 
all ego-volitional impulse and cognitive delusion—all 
mental-freedom-undermining influences. 
Since Buddhism posits that unenlightened beings—
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beings caught within the realm of mental bondage—
may become enlightened, particularly through cul-
tivation of the sort of meditation-based volitional/
metavolitional self-regulation discussed above, Bud-
dhism implicitly rejects the impossibility argument: 
mentally unfree beings are beings whose choices and 
actions are influenced in mental-bondage-fostering 
ways by certain mental states, but they can attain men-
tal states that reverse and extend beyond the reach of 
such influences and that completely extinguish them. 
This is clearly not thought to require any ex nihilo causa 
sui, so one way to diagnose Strawson’s error would be 
to say he wrongly presupposes that the only way to 
attain 0 influence is to be a causa sui. Alternatives in-
clude nirvāṇa, being created with libertarian free will 
by God, being created somehow analogously by an ex-
pert simulated-world programmer (such that all your 
programming leaves it open how your first choice 
emerges), etc. Nirvāṇa is a possibility model for what 
the impossibility argument says is impossible. It also 
reveals that argument commits a sorites fallacy. 
I noted a qualification in the beginning of this section 
about the targets of Strawson’s impossibility argument 
and of the Buddhist response, suggesting possible 
cross-purposes. Strawson specifically targets non-nat-
uralistic, ultimate-moral-responsibility-entailing con-
ceptions of agency, but does not target naturalistic, 
conventional conceptions of moral-responsibility-en-
tailing agency that may be described as proximal, rel-
ative, or compatibilist. Since the Buddhist alternative 
on proposal here consists of some version of the latter 
conception, arguably Strawson’s impossibility argu-
ment does not threaten the Buddhist alternative, in 
which case one might object that the Buddhist argu-
ment here misses the mark. True, insofar as Buddhism 
offers a naturalistic alternative, it is abstractly immune 
from arguments that target non-naturalistic concep-
tions (e.g., the causa sui). That—and how—Buddhism 
circumscribes such arguments is no doubt philosoph-
ically interesting. 
However, Strawson’s impossibility argument has col-
lateral damage for Buddhism insofar as it implies that 
nirvāṇa—freedom from all present/prior condition-
ing—is impossible. Thus, Buddhism is warranted in 
responding to this collateral damage. Indeed, I take 
it that it is ‘collateral non-damage’ and a virtue of the 
Buddhist defense of nirvāṇa that it undermines one 
of the most powerful anti-autonomy arguments. 
Dharma-responsive Responsible Agency 
The Buddhist teachings, path, or way may be re-
ferred to as the Dharma (Sanskrit; Pāli: Dhamma), 
which term more generally denotes the soteriolog-
ically relevant dimension of the truth (according to 
Buddhist understanding). If an agent is sufficiently 
dharmic—sensitive and responsive to the truths of 
impermanence, insubstantiality, and impersonality 
as well as to the suffering of sentient beings—she is 
what I have described as Dharma-responsive (Repetti 
2010b). Dharma-responsiveness is a species of what 
compatibilist and semi-compatibilist philosophers like 
Wolf  (1990) and Fischer (2006), respectively, have 
described as reason-responsiveness, and have identified 
as playing a central role in determining the extent to 
which agents exhibit determinism-friendly responsi-
ble agency. 
Semi-compatibilists separate moral responsibility from 
autonomy: they are incompatible (hard) determinists 
about autonomy because they think it requires inde-
terminism, but compatible (soft) determinists about 
moral responsibility because they think reason-re-
sponsiveness suffices for it and is compatible with de-
terminism. Reason-responsiveness may be compared 
with wind-responsiveness: a weathervane that func-
tions according to its intended purpose is sensitive to 
the flow of wind as well as responsive to it, whereas 
a malfunctioning weathervane (e.g., a rusted one) is 
neither. Likewise, a rational being recognizes relevant 
reasons in varying contexts and responds to them ap-
propriately in choice and action. 
Wolf, Fischer and other compatibilists and semi-com-
patibilists reason differently to the shared conclusion 
that even if agents lack the kind of autonomous ability 
required to do otherwise under identical conditions 
(impossible in a deterministic world, but possible in 
an indeterministic world or under a dualistic mod-
el), insofar as they are moderately reason-responsive, 
they have enough of a compatibilist kind of auton-
omy that renders them morally responsible for their 
actions, precisely because they are able to recognize 
and respond appropriately to moral reasons—they are 
functional moral agents, able to regulate volitions for 
moral reasons (equivalent to metavolitions about vo-
litions).
Dharmic reasons are a species of reasons; Dharma-re-
sponsiveness is a species of reason-responsiveness. 
Science, Religion & Culture
May 2015 | Volume 2 | Issue 2 | Page 92                                                      
                              
Thus, just as reason-responsiveness grounds compat-
ibilist moral agency, so does Dharma-responsiveness. 
This is a logical point, but substantive features of 
Dharma-responsiveness establish the same conclusion 
on extra-logical, Buddhism-intrinsic grounds. For a 
Dharma-responsive agent is independently sensitive 
to a network of moral reasons that concern whether 
entities will suffer and that exclude biological and re-
lated attributes (kin, gender, species, etc.), rendering 
them altruistic reasons. 
Thus, Dharma-responsive agents are not only respon-
sible agents, but at a level most consider supererogato-
ry. Responsible agency here may be construed as caus-
al/metaphysical responsibility, not merely utilitarian 
in the sense critics intend by the idea that fostering 
attitudes, norms, and institutions of holding people 
responsible (possibly by Skinnerian means)—even 
though, metaphysically, they are not responsible—
has social utility. For this sort of responsible agency 
involves a complex array of CPAs the satisfaction of 
which indicates that the agent instantiates volition-
al regulation and possesses what may be considered 
Buddhist autonomy. 
From the soteriologically framed perspective of 
Buddhism, the more general abilities that constitute 
reason-responsiveness only matter insofar as they 
support Dharma-responsiveness, though the same so-
teriological instrumentality limits the importance of 
this Buddhist form of autonomy. Nonetheless, despite 
its intrinsic unimportance, this form of autonomy is 
instrumentally essential to the entire Buddhist soteri-
ological project, despite also the fact that upon attain-
ment of the ultimate Buddhist goal of nirvāṇa, what 
constitutes the agent—in an important sense, namely, 
ego-volition-functionality—ceases to exist. But this 
is the attainment of total freedom, paradoxically: a 
kind of agentless agency (a concept explored in depth 
in Repetti 2016; 2016b). 
Autonomous Non-agents? The Deflationary 
Self 
This model of responsible agency is consistent with 
deflationary models of the self, as articulated by 
Siderits (2003), Strawson (1986), Flanagan (2002), 
Thompson (2015), and others: the self is not a thing, 
but a densely clustered set of causal processes that are 
significantly reflexively looped within the cognitive/
conative, metacognitive/metavolitional dimensions of 
the ultimately impersonal psychophysical stream that 
is a person-series and that significantly shapes itself. 
This ultimately impersonal person-series/set of (skill-
fully self-regulating) processes Buddhists refer to con-
ventionally as an ārya, who through practice cultivates 
effective metavolitions, is highly (causally) responsible 
for shaping and sculpting the sort of self-process the 
ārya becomes over time, and the more she does, the 
greater her (morally) responsible agency, though the 
more she advances the less substantive, static, or real 
her self or her autonomy seems to her. 
Theoretically, maximal mental freedom thorough-
ly eliminates the illusion of the separateness of the 
self-process associated with responsible agency. But 
in total mental freedom there’s no need for self-reg-
ulation, as there is no longer any separate, ego-voli-
tion-constituted psychological complex—conceived 
by itself as—driving the person-series. Enlightened 
action is spontaneously dharmic, in harmony with the 
Dharma, the way ultimate reality is. 
Socratic Buddhist Wisdom: Awareness of Ig-
norance and Illusion 
Socratic wisdom consists in awareness of one’s igno-
rance, of the difference between what one does and 
doesn’t know. Buddhism, philosophy, and science 
share this aim of uncovering ways in which we are 
subject to ignorance/illusion, in favor of a more ul-
timate reality (Blackmore 2014). Buddhism admits 
we are mostly unfree because we are, more frequently 
than not, in the grip of mental states that are delud-
ed about the self and related misconceptions (perma-
nence, substantiality, wholeness, and so on) and thus 
filled with imbalances of volitional attraction or aver-
sion such as greed and hatred, respectively. It seeks 
to bring practitioners into greater awareness of these 
delusions. In these regards, it aspires to enacting and 
embodying Socratic wisdom.
From the ultimate or enlightened perspective, 
everything conditioned, relative and conventional is 
relatively illusory, but that does not eliminate impor-
tant distinctions within the relative domain, such as 
that between freedom and bondage, wholes and parts, 
or those who have hands and amputees. Rather, the 
sort of relative, proximal autonomy Buddhism culti-
vates is necessary to attain the non-illusory perspec-
tive of total mental freedom, enlightenment.
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The Consequence Argument, Neo-compatibi-
lism, and the Manipulation Argument 
This Buddhist conception of freedom also fares well 
against other powerful forms of autonomy pessimism, 
such as the consequence and manipulation arguments. 
Let’s review the consequence argument to segue into 
the more challenging manipulation argument, which 
builds on the consequence argument idea that deter-
mined behavior cannot be free. 
The consequence argument entails that determin-
ism leaves open only a single event-series or single 
outcome in each moment, thus an agent can never 
bring about anything other than what is already a 
determined consequence of past conditions together 
with the laws of nature, so he cannot do other than 
he does, lacks autonomy, and cannot be morally re-
sponsible (van Inwagen 1975). But neo-compatibil-
ists like Frankfurt (1971), Dennett (1984), and Flana-
gan (2002) argue plausibly, along divergent lines, that 
causation is consistent with some version of respon-
sible agency—lines similar to those about metavoli-
tional/volitional regulation, reason-responsiveness, 
and so forth. This is likely why incompatibilists tend 
to rely more heavily, as many, like Pereboom (2001), 
now do, on the manipulation argument. 
The manipulation argument asserts, most generally, 
that whatever criteria the compatibilist produces as 
sufficient for autonomy can be indirectly designed so 
as to be satisfied by the agent proximately but ultimate-
ly by a hidden manipulator, and that determinism is 
functionally analogous to, or morally indistinct from, 
such manipulation. In the classic version, Pereboom 
adduces a four-case version of the argument: in the 
first case, say, case A, a neuroscientist remotely manip-
ulates an agent’s neurons, rendering the agent unfree 
(even if the agent apparently satisfies various compat-
ibilist criteria); in B, the agent’s brain was modified 
and programmed during infancy in such a way that it 
would lead to the agent’s making the same choice as 
in case A (and satisfy the same criteria); in C, circum-
stances in the agent’s environment are manipulated 
so as to lead the agent to make that same choice; and, 
in D, determinism is true. Pereboom challenges the 
optimist to identify a morally relevant, principled dif-
ference between any two adjacent cases, claims there 
cannot be any, and thus that determinism is no differ-
ent from (responsible-agency-undermining) manipu-
lation. 
Various versions of the argument identify various 
forms of manipulation, internal, external, intentional, 
and otherwise, and some versions order them in a sort 
of sliding scale of intuitions, but because the agent is 
only proximally but not ultimately responsible for the 
fact that she satisfies the criteria in either case (in one 
set of cases via manipulation, in the other via deter-
ministic means), all versions place the burden on the 
compatibilist to identify a relevant difference between 
the ways in which such forms of manipulation are 
autonomy-undermining and the way in which deter-
minism is not (Vihvelin 2011). This is considered by 
many to be the strongest argument against compati-
bilism. What can the Buddhist say in response?
Enlightened Brains in Vats
Suppose the ārya has satisfied sufficiently many Bud-
dhism-specific CPA-type principles, whatever they 
may be, rendering her significantly metavolitionally 
self-regulating, Dharma-responsive, etc., thus exhib-
iting a robust Buddhist form of autonomy. Suppose 
further that ārya was manipulated by agent-extrin-
sic means: conjure up whichever type of manipula-
tive scenario suits your ‘phi-fi’ imagination (neural 
implants, cult brainwashing, futuristic bionic/cyborg 
brains designed in Skinnerian societies—whatever). 
(I coined the neologism phi-fi for philosophical fiction, 
akin to sci-fi (Repetti 2010a).) In the same way that 
these sorts of conditions are obviously the manipula-
tive causes of the agent’s merely proximal satisfaction 
of the putative autonomy criteria and thus the agent 
only appears to be autonomous, so too if determinism 
is true, then determinism necessarily triggered a set 
of functionally equivalent, ultimately agent-extrinsic 
conditions that brought it about that the agent prox-
imally satisfied those compatibilist autonomy condi-
tions, in which case—by parity of reasoning—it only 
appears that the Buddhist is autonomous in a deter-
ministic world, but really is no more autonomous than 
those directly manipulated agents in Pereboom’s four-
case argument. 
This seems even more pressing in the face of the Bud-
dhist denial of the ultimate reality of the self, for it is 
bad enough for a non-Buddhist to face a challenge to 
the effect that the putative agent is really just a puppet 
whose strings are controlled by someone else, whereas 
for the Buddhist there is not even a puppet to be con-
trolled by others, but only strings controlled by imper-
sonal forces and processes. The burden thus appears 
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to be squarely on the Buddhist to identify a relevant 
difference between impersonally/deterministically 
caused proximal satisfaction of autonomy criteria and 
their manipulated proximal satisfaction.
The Buddhist model of freedom that I have been for-
mulating, however, may easily respond to this argu-
ment, and more easily than the more generic compat-
ibilist can. Suppose the neural correlates of a robust 
form of autonomy or even of nirvāṇa could be gener-
ated by neuroscientific manipulation. Would that un-
dermine them? Absolutely not! With manipulative en-
emies like that, one would not need friends. Whether 
my satisfaction of the metavolition-regulating, men-
tal-freedom-generating and related CPA-type Bud-
dhist counterfactuals, or my partial or total mental 
freedom was brought about by manipulation, deter-
minism, chance, the Buddha’s blessings, God’s grace, 
my meditative efforts, or anything else whatsoever 
does not matter at all. And that is because whatever 
has led me to be free has freed me! After over 40 years of 
often tremendously difficult meditation practice of my 
own, not to mention endless struggles with unwhole-
some volitions and the like in unrelentingly under-
mining daily routines, I would be among the first to 
volunteer to be so manipulated. If only it was so easy!
The generic compatibilist may need to differenti-
ate between manipulation and determinism, insofar 
as such a theory is committed to backward-looking 
or historical considerations (i.e., to identify features 
of its causal history that explain how it came to act 
freely). For the autonomous agent on that model is 
construed to have a kind of independent identity and 
integrity as a relatively/partly self-constituting being, 
a construction that is intuitively jeopardized by direct 
or indirect (historical) manipulation. The Buddhist, 
however, has no such commitments, is not vulnerable 
to such worries, and thus is under no burden to spec-
ify backward-looking principles that can differentiate 
between the two types of genetic cases. Likewise, lib-
ertarians—who embrace indeterminism to avoid the 
consequence and manipulation arguments—are more 
vulnerable to a genetic objection about the chance 
origination of their putatively free choices (the ar-
gument from randomness), whereas Buddhists can 
accept a kind of fortunate enlightenment, though 
doctrinally they happen to reject chance because the 
Buddha rejected it (Federman 2010).
With or without such manipulation, once one has 
become a skilled meditator, one is able to cultivate 
mindfulness of volitional states (and many other cog-
nitive states) sufficient to enable one to detach from 
their influences, whatever their origins. The ārya, 
having reached an advanced stage in practice (by 
whatever means), instantiates an established state of 
mental quiescence, detachment, and clarity sufficient 
to maintain equanimity and remain unperturbed and 
unaffected by the arising and fading of all other men-
tal states, regardless of whether those states occur ran-
domly, deterministically, or as a result of manipulation. 
In fact, certain Buddhists advocate the use of fear and 
other manipulative devices as skillful means (a Bud-
dhist doctrine approving otherwise immoral means 
to soteriological ends) precisely on the grounds that, 
all things considered, doing so will alleviate mental 
bondage (Goodman 2009; Shantideva and Padmaka-
ra 2008). It would not matter for purposes of this ar-
gument if such a being were a cyborg fresh off a futur-
istic Buddhist assembly line, for if once such a being is 
activated it instantiates the requisite causal/functional 
cognitive/volitional abilities, apart from being as close 
(functionally) to a causa sui as possible, that cyborg is 
as free as its naturally-arising cousin. 
If Buddhism is right about the possibility of culti-
vating mental freedom, then the ārya can escape the 
intensely manipulative influences even of psychic ven-
triloquists of the sort Descartes imagines with his de-
monic genius, or the physical equivalent as depicted 
in brain-manipulation and brain-in-a-vat scenarios. 
For it does not matter to such a being how an adhar-
mic (unwholesome) mental state arises or by what or 
whose influence: what matters is whether or not the 
mental state ought or ought not to be approved and/
or acted upon. The advanced ārya does not differenti-
ate between thoughts, volitions, or other mental states 
that are mine versus not mine in general anyway, so 
the typical vulnerability of manipulation victims to 
thoughts, volitions, or other mental states that appear 
to be mine simply does not arise. 
Indeed, in principle, if it is theoretically possible that 
a brain placed in a vat of gelatinous fluid can still have 
a functional mind, then it is equally possible that an 
ārya mind/brain in a vat can exhibit responsible agen-
cy and reach nirvāṇa. For such a minded brain in a 
vat, call it BIV, can still exhibit Dharma-responsive-
ness insofar as it remains receptive and responsive to 
dharmic reasons, albeit in a virtual world. According 
to the standard BIV thought experiment, such a mind 
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cannot tell the difference between being a BIV wired 
up to virtual senses, motor nerves, limbs, and percep-
tual fields constructed by algorithms and the like, and 
being a brain in a skull, call it BIS, connected to actual 
physical senses, motor nerves, limbs, and perceptual 
environment. Nothing changes phenomenological-
ly—ex hypothesi—between BIS and BIV. Indeed, ac-
cording to Buddhism, being BIS is equivalent to be-
ing BIV because the world is functionally equivalent 
to a virtual reality anyway insofar as it is significantly 
conceptually constructed (Garfield 2011, 2015).
If BIV were fed experiences that presented BIV the 
false impression that BIV had attained that state, this 
might appear to undermine Buddhist confidence in 
this line of argument. But technically it does not mat-
ter if anyone subjectively but falsely thinks they satisfy a 
criterion. That is no counterexample for an externalist 
account such as ours. What matters is the externalist 
condition that the mind in question truly satisfies the 
criterion, not the (true or false) internal impression to 
the mind itself that it does. Thus, this variation on the 
thought experiment may be set aside.
What matters, then, is whether or not a mind genu-
inely instantiates the functional abilities in question, 
not a momentary mental state impression to itself 
that it does, nor the historical or genetic elements of 
how it came about that it does. This is particularly 
clear in the case of enlightenment, not to be confused 
with pseudo-enlightened momentary states of altered 
consciousness—something that often fools long-
term meditation practitioners. The Buddha claims 
that on the eve of his enlightenment he escaped the 
(BIV-equivalent and evil-demon-equivalent) decep-
tions of Mara, the archetypal Buddhist cosmic de-
ceiver, akin to Descartes’s evil demon. Only, unlike 
Descartes, the Buddha did not conclude that the I 
that thinks is real. Rather, he saw through it as just 
another deception—indeed, the greatest, whereby he 
attained freedom from the self, from its will, and from 
all its manipulative influences. Once freed, nothing 
can manipulate the enlightened being: nobody is left 
to count as the target of manipulation. 
Challenge from Illusionism 
On general illusionist grounds one may doubt that 
any mental states whatsoever, meditative or otherwise, 
play any truly causally efficacious role in the sub-per-
sonal neural processes leading to choices and actions, 
given all the evidence of error associated with so 
many conscious phenomena, and the fact that med-
itative states are altered states only seems to add to 
their dubious status. But illusionism goes too far if it 
concludes that all mental states are causally impotent 
on the grounds that some of them are (Balaguer 2014).
Besides, neuroscience is not only open to the possi-
bility that the Buddhists’ claims about the causal ef-
ficacy of meditative practices may be confirmed or 
disconfirmed, if we find the neural correlates of these 
mental states and abilities (Thompson 2015), but in-
itial evidence along such lines is already promising 
(Ie, Ngnoumen, and Langer, 2014). For example, 
studies performed on Zen meditation practitioners, 
ever training to be ceaselessly responsive to the ex-
periential aspects of the present moment, reveal that 
when they are presented with repetitive stimuli their 
brains do not show any reduced responsiveness to the 
repeated stimuli, whereas the brains of those in the 
control group typically siphon off otherwise mean-
ingless repetitive stimuli after a fairly short exposure 
period (Kasulis 1985). Studies on ārya brains are actu-
ally helping neuroscientists identify neural correlates 
of conscious mental states (Thompson 2015). Studies 
performed on veteran practitioners of loving-kindness 
meditations revealed far greater neuronal mass and 
activation in the left pre-frontal cortex, the so-called 
empathy center of the brain, than the control group, 
during such meditations (Lutz, Dunne, and Davidson 
2007). Studies reveal similar neuronal alterations in 
the brain correlated with conscious meditative prac-
tices designed to discipline attention (Ricard 2011). 
Studies not connected at all with meditation but rath-
er simply with contrasting cases of mindfulness and 
mindlessness confirm similar results (Ie, Ngnoumen, 
and Langer, 2014). While these studies are too pre-
mature to ground any confidence in the claim that 
the sort of model proposed here is true, they suffice to 
support the claim that the model is not only empiri-
cally possible, but initially plausible.
Conclusion
Although this model of (somewhat paradoxically 
agentless) autonomy is predicated on the limit case 
of mental freedom, nirvāṇa, in light of the initial 
empirical confirmation of meditative practices, it is 
arguably plausible that to the extent anyone approx-
imates that limit they instantiate some modicum of 
free, responsible agency, whether their mental state at 
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the choice-moment is deterministic, manipulated, or 
conditioned.
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